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KAUFMAN, Chief Judge:
On August 5, 1973, at Hellenikon Airport in Athens, Greece, two Palestinian
terrorists hurled three grenades and unleashed a salvo of small-arms fire into a
line of passengers preparing to board TWA Flight 881 to New York. Three people
died and more than forty others were injured by this senseless act of violence.
The Warsaw Convention, I as modified by the Montreal Agreement, 2 provides,
among other things, that an airline is absolutely liable,3 to the extent of a
maximum $75,000, for bodily injury sustained "in the course of any of the
operations of embarking." ' 4 We are called upon to decide whether, under these
provisions, TWA must provide indemnification for the deaths and injuries
sustained at Athens. Our conclusion is that TWA must be held liable and that
this determination accords with the plain meaning and the underlying purpose of
the Warsaw provisions.
The attack on the passengers of TWA Flight 881 occurred after they had gone
through several of the required steps recited above and while they were standing
in line at the departure gate, to which a TWA representative had summoned
them, waiting to be searched. After seven passengers had been searched, the
terrorists made their assault upon those standing in line.
As a result of this tragedy, several of the injured passengers and the executrix of
a passenger who had died, brought suit against TWA in the Southern District of
'The Warsaw Convention is officially denominated "Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air." Concluded at Warsaw, Poland on October
12, 1929, the Convention is reproduced (in an English translation of the official French version) at
49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
'Agreement CAB 18900 (1966).
'There is an exception, not relevant in this case, for contributory negligence.
4Warsaw Convention, Art. 17.
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New York.' 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. They claimed that the airline was liable
under the Warsaw Convention for the injuries sustained and the death. After
several cases were consolidated, the plaintiffs and the defendant moved for
summary judgment on the issue of liability. Judge Brieant, in a thoughtful and
thorough opinion, 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), granted the plaintiffs'
motion. He also issued a certificate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and this
interlocutory appeal followed.
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of
a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking.'
Under the Montreal Agreement, liability for injuries described by Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention became absolute and the maximum damages were
increased to $75,000. It is undisputed, moreover, that a terrorist attack is
considered an "accident" within the purview of these provisions. See Husserl v.
SwissAir Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd 485 F.2d 1240
(2d Cir. 1973 (per curiam)). Thus, the sole issue we must resolve is whether the
passenger sustained their injuries "in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking."
TWA contended, both before Judge Brieant and on this appeal, that the
application of Article 17 should be determined by reference only to the area where
the accident occurred. Liability under the Convention should not attach, it urges,
while the passenger is inside the terminal building. The very earliest time at which
liability can commence, the appellant argues, is when the passenger steps
through the terminal gate. Judge Brieant, however, believed that "the issue...
is not where [the plaintiff s] feet were planted when the killing began, but, rather,
in what activity was he engaged." 393 F. Supp. at 220. Applying a tripartite test
based on activity (what the plaintiffs were doing), control (at whose direction) and
location, the district judge determined that Article 17 covered the attack at the
departure gate. We agree with this conclusion.
It seems elementary to us that the language employed in Article 17 must be the
logical starting point. See Article 31(1), Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"]. We are of the view that the words
"in the course of any of the operations of embarking" do not exclude events
'At the time of the attack, plaintiffs Aristedes and Constantine Day were being escorted by a
TWA passenger relations agent to the departure gate. All the other plaintiffs were standing in line
waiting to be searched. We agree with Judge Brieant that these differences in locations have no
significance to the outcome of this case.
'The official version in French is reproduced at II Conference Internationale de Droit Prive'
Aerien (1930) [hereinafter "Warsaw Minutes"].
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transpiring within a terminal building. Nor, do these words set forth any
strictures on location. Rather, the drafters of the Convention looked to whether
the passenger's actions were a part of the operation or process of embarkation, as
did Judge Brieant. 7
It is clear that Article 17 does not define the period of time before passengers
enter the interior of the airplane when the "operations of embarking" commence.
It is, nevertheless, appropriate to consider the activities of the plaintiffs in this
case as falling within the purview of this somewhat cryptic phrase. The facts
disclose that at the time of the terrorist attack, the plaintiffs had already
surrendered their tickets, passed through passport control, and entered the area
reserved exclusively for those about to depart on international flights. They were
assembled at the departure gate, virtually ready to proceed to the aircraft. The
passengers were not free agents roaming at will through the terminal. They were
required to stand in line at the direction of TWA's agents for the purpose of
undergoing a weapons search which was a prerequisite to boarding. Whether one
looks to the passengers' activity (which was a condition to embarkation), to the
restriction of their movements, to the imminence of boarding, or even to their
position adjacent to the terminal gate, we are driven to the conclusion that the
plaintiffs were "in the course of embarking." 8
Moreover, a relatively broad construction of Article 17, affording protection to
the plaintiffs under the Warsaw liability umbrella, is in harmony with modern
theories of accident cost allocation. The airlines are in a position to distribute
among all passengers what would otherwise be a crushing burden upon those few
unfortunate enough to become "accident" victims.
III
TWA does not seriously challenge the validity of these textual and policy
arguments in favor of extending coverage under the Warsaw Convention to the
victims of the Athens attack. It contends, however, that this result is foreclosed by
the legislative history of the Convention. This history, the airline claims,
establishes that the framers intended to exclude from coverage all accidents
occurring anywhere inside a terminal building. TWA correctly states that in
interpreting a treaty we may look to its legislative history .... We find, however,
TIhe French word "operation" contained in the official version of the Warsaw Convention con-
notes a process composed of many acts. It is defined in the Nouveau Petit Larousse (1950) as "En-
semble de moyens que l'on combine pour en obtenir un resultat," or "a group of procedures com-
bined to achieve a result."
'We find MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971), cited to us by the appellant,
clearly distinguishable. In MacDonald, the court declined to construe Article 17 as covering an
elderly passenger who fell after disembarking. Mrs. MacDonald was, at the time of her accident,
standing near the baggage "pickup" area, waiting for her daughter to recover her luggage. Mrs.
MacDonald was, therefore, not acting, as were the passengers in the case at bar, at the direction of
the airlines, but was free to move about the terminal. Furthermore, she was not, as were the plain-
tiffs here, performing an act required for embarkation or disembarkation. We do not, of course,
indicate any views on the correctness of the MacDonald decision.
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that, rather than undermining Judge Brieant's conclusions, the history of the
Warsaw treaty bolsters them.
The minutes of the Warsaw proceedings thus undermine TWA's contention
that the delegates wished to implement a rigid rule based solely on location of the
accident. Rather, we believe they preferred to provide latitude for the courts to
consider the factual setting of each case by considering the elements we have
referred to above.
IV
Those called upon to construe a treaty should, in the words of Judge Clark,
strive to "give the specific words of a treaty a meaning consistent with the genuine
shared expectations of the contracting parties." Maximov v. United States, 229
F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962), affd 373 U.S. 49 (1963). These expectations can, of
course, change over time. Conditions and new methods may arise not present at
the precise moment of drafting. For a court to view a treaty as frozen in the year of
its creation is scarcely more justifiable than to regard the Constitutional clock as
forever stopped in 1787. The conduct of the parties subsequent to ratification of a
treaty may, thus, be relevant in ascertaining the proper construction to accord the
treaty's various provisions .... Vienna Convention Art. 31(3).'
In divining the purposes of the Warsaw treaty, we find the adoption in 1966 of
the Montreal Agreement particularly instructive. This Agreement did not alter
the language of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. But it provides decisive
evidence of the goals and expectations currently shared by the parties to the
Warsaw Convention. The Montreal Agreement was adopted in response to a
torrent of criticism of the stringent Warsaw limitations of liability." ° For
example, in August, 1965, Senator Robert Kennedy suggested on the Senate floor
that the United States should consider denouncing (i.e. withdrawing from) the
Warsaw convention ...
On November 15, 1965, the State Department filed formal notice of
denunciation of the Warsaw treaty, to take effect six months later. An
accompanying press release stated that'the United States would be prepared to
withdraw its denunciation if the principal international air carriers agreed to
raise the liability ceiling to $75,000 and if there was a reasonable prospect that the
'We find Prof. Hyde's words especially relevant:
A court might even feel obliged to sustain [the parties' later] construction of a treaty differing
widely from that which it was in fact possible to prove to have been the design of the parties at the
time when the agreement was concluded.
11 Hyde, supra, at 72. In so acting, the court does not, of course, impose its own values upon the
parties. Rather, the court does no more than respect and implement the goals and intentions of the
parties.
"
0See generally Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn; LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW, chapter 6; and 1. L.
KRIENDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, chs. I1-12A (1971). The Warsaw Convention limited
liability to .$8300 and provided the airline with a defense of due care.
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Convention would be formally amended to incorporate this modification. 50
Dept. State Bull 923 (1965).
The Warsaw signatories were, needless to say, not unduly sanguine about the
vitality of the Warsaw treaty absent the world's largest aviation power.
Accordingly, on May 13, 1966, after months of intense negotiation, the world's
major airlines, virtually without exception, signed what became known as the
Montreal Agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, each airline filed a
special contract with the Civil Aeronautics Board raising the liability limit to
$75,000 on all flights to, from, or stopping over in the United States. It is
important 'to note, in addition, that the carriers also agreed to waive the defense of
due care. Liability was to become absolute unless the passenger himself were at
fault.
It cannot be doubted, therefore, that the Warsaw Convention now functions to
protect the passenger from the many present-day hazards of air travel and also
spreads the accident cost of air transportation among all passengers. IIHusserl v.
Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam). This is amply demonstrated by the
imposition of absolute liability and the establishment of greatly increased limits
of liability. The official statements made by the State Department, the prime
mover behind the Montreal modifications, reinforce this conclusion. 2 ...
We conclude, in sum, that the protection of the passenger ranks high among
the goals which the Warsaw signatories now look to the Convention to serve. 13 We
would add, however, that, even if we restricted our interpretation to the intent
and purposes of the Warsaw treaty as of 1929, we would reach the same result.
Since 1929, the risks of aviation have changed dramatically in ways unforesee-
"Although it was the foreign airlines, and not their respective government, who signed the agree-
ment implementing these modifications, the governments whose carriers were to participate in the
plan formally assured the United States, at the request of the State Department, that they would
permit the new plan to go into effect. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn at 594, 595. In assessing the
expectation of these foreign governments, we also find the 1971 Guatemala Protocol significant.
That protocol, adopted by a diplomatic conference at which 55 countries were represented, has been
signed to date by more than 20. The protocol will formally amend the Warsaw treaty in a manner
similar to the Montreal Agreement to provide for absolute liability up to $100,000. See LOWENFELD,
supra, at § 6.2; Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City, 38 J. AIR. L. 519 (1972).
"Indeed, our government's concept of the goals of a treaty must be given great weight even if the
othei parties hold a different view of its meaning. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298
(1938).
"'WA, citing several treatises and articles, e.g., Sullivan, The Codification ofAir Carrier Liabil-
ity by International Convention, 7 J. AIR L. 1, 20 (1936), contends that "authorities the world over"
hold that Warsaw coverage is defined by location and does not extend to accidents occurring inside
a terminal building. The simple answer to this argument is that the commentators are far from
uniform. Shawcross and Beaumont, in their treatise on AIR LAW (3rd ed. 1966), state that coverage
extends throughout "the time during which the passenger's movements are under the control of the
carrier for the purposes of embarking" and suggest that this includes "injury ... while leaving the
passenger building." Id. at 441-42. Mateesco Matte, similarly, states that coverage begins when the
passengers are taken in charge by the airlines. N. MATEESCO MATTE, TRAITE DE DRoIT AERIEN-
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able by the Warsaw framers."4 Air travel hazards, once limited to aerial disasters,
have unhappily come to include the sort of terrorism exemplified by the Athens
attack. As that incident graphically demonstrates, these new perils often spill
over into the airline terminal.
The Warsaw drafters wished to create a system of liability rules that would
cover all the hazards of air travel .... The rigid location-based rule suggested by
the appellant would ill serve that goal. Under TWA's test, many claims relating to
liability for the hazards of flying would be excluded from the Warsaw system and
would be governed by local law. Rather than serving the drafters' intent of
creating an inclusive system, appellant's proposal would frustrate it.
We believe, moreover, that the result we have reached furthers the intent of the
Warsaw drafters in a broader sense. The Warsaw delegates knew that, in the
years to come, civil aviation would change in ways that they could not foresee.
They wished to design a system of air law that would be both durable and flexible
enough to keep pace with these changes. Our holding today confirms the framers'
belief that the ever-changing needs of the system of civil aviation can be served
within the framework they created.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AERONAUTIQUE at 404-05 (1964). De Juglart regards Article 17 as possibly providing coverage for at
least some events occurring within the terminal building. M. DE JUGLART, TRAIT ELEMENTAIRE
DE-AERONAUTIQUEat4O4-05 (1964). DeJuglart regards Article 17 as possibly providing coverage for
at least some events occurring within the terminal building. M. DE JUGLART, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE
Du DROIT AgRIENat 330 (1952) (Preface by G. Ripert). Accord, Heller, Proposed Revision ofArticle
17of the Warsaw Convention, 20 INT. & CoMp. L.Q. 142, 146 (1971). And, the Court of Appeals of
Berlin, in Blumenfeld v. BEA, 11 ZLW 78 (1962), has held that Article 17 covers a passenger who falls
down a staircase leading from the terminal to the traffic apron. The court, significantly, stated that
the Convention applies because
the air carrier already commits the flight passengers under his care when he requests them to go
from the waiting room to the aircraft. [Emphasis added]
We note, moreover, that most of the texts and commentaries cited by TWA date from the 1930's;
virtually all were written before 1965. They thus antedate the 1965 United States denunciation and
the subseqent Montreal Agreement. The writers of these early treatises, moreover, could foresee
neither the advent of air terrorism nor the radical changes in boarding procedures that the ensuing
years would bring. Additionally, the purported goal of worldwide uniformity could not have been
paramount in the minds of the framers of Article 17, for they contemplated a case-by-case applica-
tion by the courts that would, to some extent at least, rely on local law.
"Some commentators have suggested that when confronted with such genuine gaps in the parties'
expectations, the interpreter should consider accepted policy goals, such as accident prevention, in
filling them. See, e.g., McDougal, supra, at 260-61.
It is relevant in this connection that the technology of embarkation has also changed in ways
unforeseeable to the Warsaw delegates. Moreover, airports are today far larger and boarding pro-
cedures substantially more complex than forty-six years ago. And, many of the operations of
embarking have been moved inside the terminal building. Indeed, even the boarding ladder, now
being increasingly replaced by the jetway, may soon become an anachronism.
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